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Background: The pension deficit has been rapidly enlarging for more than a
decade. If the retirement age is set at a low level, it might trigger a pensions crisis.
Since the average life span of the Chinese has extended from 71 to 76 years old in
last ten years, the feasibility of rising the retirement age has also been promoted.
Methods: This paper aims to construct a mathematical model for choosing a proper
policy about raising retirement age on the basis of the interaction between shortage
of pension funds and labor market. It has also conducted a simulation analysis over
the economic efficiency and political feasibility of a uniformed or a differentiated
retirement-age delay policy.
Results: Our findings show that it is up to how effective the pension deficit is
closed, how many employments will be crowded out, and whether it is politically
acceptable that the length and kind of the delay is decided. From the policy effect
of raising retirement age, a soft approach to delaying retirement will be better than
a tough one, and a differentiated method will be better than a uniformed one. The
root cause for the inconsistency of the policy effect is the discrepancies in terms of
wage rate and job fulfillment, brought by different human capital situations and
individual differences of the insured. The shortage of pension funds can be more
effectively closed, and the impact on new labor force will be reduced, if we employ
a differentiated approach to delay retirement according to the pattern of human
capital accumulation and the supply and demand status of labor force.
Conclusions: Based on the above research, Not only can the differentiated approach
crowd out fewer new employees, but also it can acquire support from the majority
of the insured. We must attach importance to the role of human capital investment
in addressing pension and employment crises, especially the low- skilled labor, can
get more vocational training and academic education.
Keywords: Pensions, Shortage of pension funds, The retirement delay, Labor marketBackground
The pension deficit has been rapidly enlarging for more than a decade. The gap was
35.7 billion yuan in 2000, and it surged to 57.6 billion yuan in 2005, 70 billion yuan in
2011, and exceeded 100 billion in 2012. It is astonishingly expected to overpass 150
billion yuan. 1 The shortage of pension funds is closely related to the growth of aging
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hand, the growth of the aged population has increased the government’s spending on
pensions. On the other hand, the dwindling young population has limited the revenue
of pensions. If the retirement age is set at a low level, it might trigger a pension crisis
(Zeng 2005). Compared with European and US retirement ages, which are usually be-
tween 65 and 67, China’s retirement ages—men at 60 years old and women at 50 years
old—are apparently at low level (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1997; Xu et al. 2003). 3 In order
to avoid the deterioration of the pension crisis, adjusting the retirement age becomes
necessary (Song 2010). Since the average life span of the Chinese has extended from 71
to 76 years old in last 10 years, the feasibility of rising the retirement age has also been
promoted.4
Whether people are fulfilled with their jobs determines whether they are in favor of
the retirement delay. And whether they feel fulfilled depends on their human capital
and productivity. The blue-collar workers usually have fewer human capital and lower
productivity. They feel less fulfilled with their jobs as their human capital depreciates
and are inclined to depart from the labor market at a relatively young age. According
to a poll carried by People’s Daily Online, 68.6 % of the respondents voted against rising
the retirement age.5 But the high-skilled workers with more human capital and higher
productivity, as their job fulfillment and wage rate are in a positive correlation with the
growth of their human capital, tend to retire old. For example, the same poll showed
that 31.4 % of the respondents voted for rising the retirement age.5 Thus, a differenti-
ated approach to delaying retirement, based on different human capital and productive-
ness, will get more endorsement.
Besides the differences in human capital, the efficiency of distributing labor forces
and the employment pressures should be taken into consideration in choosing a better
plan to delay retirement (Gendell 1998). If the oversupplied low-skilled manpower
delay to retire, the labor market will not be obviously impacted by a crowing-out effect.
The workers contribute a certain percentage of their salaries to the pension’s fund pool
every month. Therefore, the funding source of pensions will not be affected. Thus, if
we can extend the retirement age according to the status of demand and supply of dif-
ferent labor forces, the pension crisis can be more properly dealt with.
However, in recent years, China’s unemployment rate has exceeded the inter-
nationally accepted alarm level of 4 %.6 From 2008 to 2013, the unemployment rates
are 4.2, 4.3, 4.1, 4.1, and 4.1 %.7 From now to 2035, there will be a long period when
China can enjoy demographic dividend. Labor supply during the 12th 5-year plan
will surpass 900 million, so there will not be a shortfall of labor forces. Relevant data
indicate that there will be 25 million people entering the urban labor market every
year, but only 12 million can land jobs, which means there will be 10 million newly
added people jobless in the labor market every year.8 Given the already tough and
deteriorating employment situation, the crowding effect in employment should be
given full consideration when choosing a proper plan to extend the retirement age
(Gendell 1998). Since a differentiated approach to delaying retirement can cause
smaller impacts than a uniformed approach, it should be served as a primary
strategy.
So far, there is a heated debate among people from all walks of life especially the aca-
demia about which is a better plan of delaying retirement. After considering the
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elaborate mathematical analysis and simulation comparison between different policy
options of the retirement delay to study their capabilities of closing a large pension def-
icit, their crowing-out effect, and political feasibility. This could serve as a reference for
the government to reform the pension system.Literature review
Since China reformed its pension system into a combination of social pooling with in-
dividual accounts in 1995, the pension deficit is getting increasingly larger. From 2010
to 2012, the deficit was 1.7 trillion yuan, 2.2 trillion yuan, and 2.9 trillion yuan, respect-
ively. 91011 The deficit in 2013 is expected to be astonishingly 18 trillion yuan.12 The
distressful financial record leaves Chinese authorities no wiggle room but to reform the
system. A proposal made by Tsinghua University shows that China will become a super
aging society in 2030, in which one social security retiree will be supported by two
workers on average. In order to fix the shortage of pension funds, the proposal believes
it is necessary to extend the retirement age to 65 years old. Zheng Bingwen, Director of
Center for International Social Security Studies, affiliated to the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, supports that it is a routine method adopted by the international com-
munity to deal with an aging population and an unavoidable way to close the pension
gap. Yet, Cai Fang, Director of the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, affili-
ated to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, holds another view. He believes the re-
tirement delay should not be a one-size-fits-all policy. A uniformed approach to extend
the retirement age will put into a disadvantageous position the low-skilled manpower
that do not have competitive human capital. He thinks that if the retirement delay were
carried out, the high-skilled manpower that have an edge in human capital should take
the brunt. Ren Haoning, a consultant at China Investment Consulting agency, holds a
more pointed attitude toward the retirement delay, saying that it is a “rob Peter to pay
Paul” strategy. If the retirement age is put off by a year, the pension deficit can be alleviated
by 20 billion yuan a year, on the cost of additional 6–7 million people jobless.13 In the face
of the worsening pension crisis and the high unemployment rate, what should the Chinese
government do? There are heated discussions among some scholars about whether China
should adopt a uniformed or a differentiated approach to the retirement delay.
Scholars hold different opinions on whether delaying retirement can deal with the pen-
sion crisis. Lin and Gong (2007) and Wang and Mi (2013) argue that if the retirement age
is set at a low level, early retirement becomes prevalent, a pension crisis is likely to hap-
pen. Retirement age should be adjusted according to the changing life expectancy. Now,
the retirement age of Chinese urban citizens is not only lower than that of Chinese rural
citizens but also much lower than that of the urban citizens in most developed countries
(Zhao 2009). Although extending the retirement age is not a panacea for the pension cri-
sis, it could largely alleviate workers from the heavy pressures of paying insurance. For ex-
ample, in Austria, the contribution rate of individuals to the pension program has been
reduced about 8~14 % after extending the retirement age (Jaag et al. 2010). However, Lei
et al. (2010) argued that although the retirement delay should be carried out as soon as
possible, a cookie-cutter approach should not be encouraged. People should be allowed to
have more options about their retirement age on their own will. For instance, people who
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costs of public pensions but also address the looming labor shortages associated with an
aging population (Van Dalen et al. 2010).
However, Weller (2002) argued that rising the retirement age will not contain the en-
larging pension funding gap but reduce the pensions of low-income population. The re-
sult will run counter to the primary objectives of social security that aims to eliminate
poverty of the aging population and narrow down the gap between the rich and poor.
In fact, given that pensions are inheritable, the pension deficit is not necessarily con-
nected with the aging population, and there are a few uncertainties about the effect of
the retirement delay over the alleviation of the pension deficit (Zhang 2006). Yet, if we
put the growing life expectancy into consideration, the pension gap will be in a correl-
ation with the aging population. By extending retirement age, the social security pro-
gram can pool more funds because people have to pay more money into their pension
accounts for a longer time, which could offset the effect of the retirement delay over
closing the pension gap (Zhang 2007).
However, according to our research, the effect of the retirement delay over closing
the pension gap depends on the situation and accumulation of human capital of the
insured. Low-skilled workers will find their human capital declining at older ages
(Skirbekk 2008), so their contributions in their pension plans will decrease along with
the wage rate. Extending their working life will not do anything good to address the
pension crisis. For high-skilled workers, the human capitals are on an upward trajec-
tory, so their contributions in their pension plans can increase with the wage rate.
Extending their working life will help alleviate the pension crisis.
Even though the retirement delay is able to reduce the pension gap, its impact to the
labor market cannot be ignored. Some experts have discussed this question. Li (1997)
argues that unemployment rate is related to labor cost. Early retirement means the
pensioners can enjoy a longer period of pension collection, which rise the labor cost.
As a result, unemployment rate goes up. Thus, the retirement delay can mitigate em-
ployment pressures and the extension of life expectancy makes it feasible. As their life
expectancy grows, the insured can get higher return on investment in human capital
and become more willing to retire late (Lin and Gong 2007). From an empirical view,
Hairault et al. (2010) analyze the boost of the retirement delay to employment. They
argued that a low level of statutory retirement age would not only increase the un-
employment rate of the insured before retirement but also make more new workers
lose their job. The retirement delay can mitigate the structural contradiction created by
the oversupply of labor force.
On the contrary, Martins et al. (2009) hold that the retirement delay does not gener-
ate as many benefits as the above research has shown. Given wage rigidity and employ-
ment protection laws, extending retirement age will have a crowding-out effect on
employment. If the retirement delay is carried out holistically, enterprises, after putting
into consideration the possible legal consequences and loss of profits, will have to cut
headcounts for new recruits, so the employees who have been delayed retiring can con-
tinue occupying their original positions. This will result in a rise of unemployment rate.
Ding and Lv (2014) believes that the impact of the retirement delay on employment
and distribution of labor force varies based on individuals. On the one hand, if we can
put off the retirement age of high-skilled manpower, their human capital can have a
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they can spare their jobs to more energetic new labor force entrants. This can increase
the efficiency of distribution of labor force distribution. This paper also believes that in
the process of deciding how to extend the retirement age, individuality warrants par-
ticular attention. Using a differentiated approach to extending retirement age can make
a smaller impact on the labor market.
Through literature review, we can realize that there are basically two voices about
whether and how to extend retirement age. Although some scholars have conducted
research on human capital and some related issues, most of their works focus on an
introspection of concrete issues and the current system. Few of them have tried to
explore the interaction between the pension deficit and the labor market from the
structural perspective. This paper will start from the heterogeneity of human capital
and the disequilibrium of labor force and explore the dynamic of wage rate, unemploy-
ment rate, and job fulfillment, which are attached to the accumulation pattern of
human capital, so that we can conduct a thorough model analysis and data simulation
for the timing and effect of the retirement delay.Methods
Research hypothesis and the model
Research hypothesis
H1: The fact that individual accounts are empty and only have the function of account-
ing indicates that the current pension system that features a combination of social
pooling with individual accounts is still a pay-as-you-go mechanism. In their working
years, the insured pay premiums (τw) to the government on the basis of wage rates (w).
After retirement, they can get pensions that are distributed according to a uniform pen-
sion replacement rate (θ) and benchmarked against the social average wage rate (w)
during their working years. The mechanism of pay-as-you-go system, requiring the
working people to support the retired, refers that the decline of population growth (n)
will definitely aggravate the crisis of pension deficit (d). If the government does not
want to thoroughly reform the current pension system into a fund, the insured will
have to be delayed to retire in order to balance the budget.
H2: The insured live two periods—the working years and the retirement, either of
which is measured by a standard unit. The insured inelastically offer one unit of work
during the working years, and the labor supply (δ) is decided by the substation relations
u between consumption (c) and leisure (le), 0 ≤ δ < 1.
H3: The labor productivity of the insured varies according to different individuals.
The labor productivity of the high-skilled workers is higher than that of the low-skilled
workers; thus, the wage rate of the high-skilled is also higher than that of the low-
skilled, i.e., wh >w > wl. Labor productivity is related to human capital. The longer the
high-skilled workers work, the more human capital they can gather. This is the other
way around for low-skilled workers (Skirbekk 2008). Therefore, the labor productivity
of the high-skilled workers will be increasingly high, but that of the low-skilled workers
will be going down.
H4: The variation of the labor productivity is the root cause for the diversifica-
tion of the wage rate, unemployment rate, and job fulfillment. The higher labor
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get, and the lower unemployment rate there will be. On the contrary, with lower
labor productivity the insured have comes lower wage rate and job fulfillment and
higher unemployment rate. Therefore, the insured who have higher labor product-
ivity are inclined to rise the retirement age more deeply than the insured with
lower labor productivity.
H5: The retirement delay has a crowding-out effect on new labor force (Gendell
1998). The longer the retirement delay is, the bigger the crowding-out effect will be,
and the effect varies according to different individuals. Generally speaking, the retire-
ment delay has little effect on the high-skilled workers whose unemployment rate (e) is
low but has much impact on low-skilled workers whose unemployment rate (e) is
usually high. Therefore, a differentiated approach to rise retirement age, allowing high-
skilled manpower to retire later than low-skilled manpower, can cause much softer
crowding-out effect than a cookie-cutter approach to delay retirement.
Modeling
The utility function and constraint Utility is only related to consumption (c), which
is encompassed by two parts: consumption during working years (cw) and consumption
after retirement (cr). The intertemporal consumption can be indicated by a separable
logarithmic utility function.
U cw; crð Þ ¼ 1ncw þ 11þ ρ 1ncr ð1Þ
ρ refers to the intertemporal consumption preference, and ρ ≥ 0. Given the employ-
ment rate (e), the consumption during working years (cw) stems from the working
reward (w) with the premiums (τw) and personal savings (s) deducted, which is as
follows:
cw ¼ 1−τð Þ 1−eð Þwt−1−s
The consumption after retirement is more complicated than the consumption
during working years. It includes personal savings and interests (1 + r)s, pensions
(θw), and rewards acquired by working in retirement δ(1 − φτ)w. The equation is as
follows:
cr ¼ 1þ rð Þsþ θ 1−eð Þwt−1 þ δ 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt− 12 μδ
2:
































During a crisis of pension deficit, the government will generally give tax preferencesto the pensioners who choose to work in retirement in order to reduce the resistance
on the retirement delay; thus, 0 ≤ ϕ < 1. Working in retirement will bring disutility (μ)
to pensioners. The stronger the substitution effect leisure has on consumption, the
higher cost we have to pay to increase consumption. Therefore, we put 1/2μδ2 in the
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tirement delay.
The optimal length of time of working (δ*) if the insured choose to work in
retirement The formulation to reflect the best decision by the insured who are in re-
tirement is as follows:
Maxu
δ
crð Þ ¼ 1n 1þ rð Þsþ θ 1−eð Þwt−1 þ δ 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt− 12 μδ
2
 
: If the optimal
time of working for the insured (δ) satisfies
1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt−μδ
1þ rð Þsþ θ 1−eð Þwt−1 þ δ 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt− 12 μδ2
¼ 0;
then the optimal length of time of working for the insured who choose to work inretirement is
δ ¼ 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt=μ: ð2Þ
The effect of the retirement delay on pension deficit (d) On the basis of the actuar-
ial arrangement that the working population should support the retired population, in
order to address the pension crisis caused by the aging population, if the retirement
age is rised, the amount of pension deficit will be as follows:
















In the equation, Nt
wh and Nt
wl respectively refer to the number of high-skilled workers
and low-skilled workers, where t refers to period of working years and Nt
rh and Nt
rl
respectively refer to the high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers, where t refers to
period in retirement. Nt (the number of the insured during their working years) and
N
t
(the number of the insured in retirement) satisfy this equation: Nt = (1 + n)Nt.wt and wlt
are the wage rates of high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers. The average wage
rate wt in the period t and the average wage rate wt−1 in the period t − 1 satisfy the




















The impact of unemployment rate (e) on the retirement delay Assume in the period
t, the total number of labor force is Nw, and the number of job opportunities is T. If
the retirement is not delayed, i.e., δ = 0, the unemployment rate can be indicated as
e ¼ Nw−Tð Þ=Nw ¼ 1−T=Nw:
If the retirement is delayed, i.e., δ > 0, the unemployment rate can be modified as









Nw ¼ 1þ δ= 1þ nð Þ−T=Nw;
in which δ ¼
X
i¼h;lNt
riδi=Nrt . Thus, the increment in unemployment rate (Δe) due to




riδi=Nw ¼ δ= 1þ nð Þ: ð4Þ
Selection mechanism of the retirement delay
How to choose the right retirement plan under the restraint of pension deficit and
unemployment
If we adopt a differentiated policy to rise retirement age (δh ≠ δl), we can acquire the


































If we adopt a uniformed policy to rise retirement age δ ¼ δ ¼ δ , we can acquireh 1
the overall marginal effect of the retirement delay δ
 
































Since 0 < e < 1, so ∑i = h,1 d/ δ < 0. This means no matter which policy we adopt, a dif-
ferentiated one or a uniformed one, the pension crisis can be relieved. However, ac-
cording Eq. 4, the retirement delay can cause crowding-out effect on employment,
which is illustrated in this equation:
d Δeð Þ=dδ ¼ 1= 1þ nð Þ:
If d Δeð Þ=dδ > 0, the retirement delay will increase the average unemployment rate
(ē). Besides, ∑i = h,l∂d/∂δi will be bigger as ē grows, indicating that the retirement delay
results in the increase of unemployment rate, in which the situation will weaken its role
in bridging the pension gap.
There is structural conflict in which there is an oversupply of low-skilled manpower
and short supply of high-skilled workers. Low-skilled manpower’s human capital will
depreciate and the high-skilled manpower’s human capital will appreciate in their re-
tirements. Therefore, the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers is always higher
than high-skilled workers whether in their working years or in retirement (el > eh).
Thus, the retirement delay can cause bigger crowding-out effect to low-skilled workers
than high-skilled workers, which can be shown as the following:
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In the equation, el0 and el1 are, respectively, the unemployment rates of low-skilledworkers when they are in the working years and retirement. eh0 and eh1 are, respect-
ively, the unemployment rates of high-skilled workers when they are in the working
years and retirement.
Since low-skilled workers occupy the majority of the labor market, if they have to re-



































A uniformed approach to rising retirement age δ ¼ δ ¼ δ  can increase theh 1
average unemployment rate (ē). On the one hand, it can reduce the tax base of re-
tirement pension premium, which is the weighted average wage rate wð Þ . On the
other hand, it will cut down the source of contribution in the pension fund, which
is the number of labor force who should pay premiums to their retirement portfo-
lio [(2 + n)(1 − ē)/(1 + n)]Nw. Therefore, with the growth of the crowding-out effect
overemployment, a uniformed approach to rising retirement age will have weaker
impact on closing pension deficit.
If we carry out a differentiated approach to rising retirement age (δh ≠ δl) based on
the supply of labor force and the dynamic pattern of human capital, such as allowing
high-skilled workers to retire later than low-skilled workers, it will not only reduce the
impact over the labor market but also increase the tax base of retirement pension pre-
mium—the average wage rate. Therefore, the pension deficit can be better dealt with.
















Thus, it can be concluded that in terms of reducing the crowing-out effect on em-ployment, and closing the pension deficit, a differentiated approach to rise retirement
age is better than a uniformed one.
How to choose the right plan for the retirement delay based on political feasibility
According to Eq. 2, we can take the derivative of δ with respect to e
dδ  =de ¼ − 1−ϕτð Þwt=μ:
dδ*/de < 0 means that people’s willingness to delay retirement is inversely propor-
tional to unemployment rate (e). If the unemployment rate grows increasingly higher,
the insured will only agree to rise the retirement age in a smaller range. Since the un-
employment rate of low-skilled workers is higher than that of the high-skilled workers,
the low-skilled workers will not agree with a range of delay as wide as the high-skilled
workers.
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dδ  =dw ¼ − 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þ=μ:
dδ*/dw > 0 means people’s willingness to rise retirement age is positively correlatedwith wage rate (w). The insured will agree with a wider range of delay if their wage rate
is higher. Since the human capital of low-skilled workers will depreciate as they get
older, their wage rate will accordingly decline, so they will become less willing to delay
retirement. But since the human capital of high-skilled workers will grow stronger as
they get older, their wage rate will accordingly increase, so they will become more
willing to retire later.
According to Eq. 2, we can take the derivative of δ with respect to μ
dδ  =dμ ¼ − 1−ϕτð Þ 1−eð Þwt=μ2
dδ*/dμ > 0 means that people’s willingness of delaying retirement is inversely propor-tional to the substitution effect of leisure on consumption (μ). The bigger the substitu-
tion effect is (work brings bigger negative impact), the fewer years of rise (δ) the
insured will agree on. Since their human capital depreciates as they get older, low-
skilled workers will feel less fulfillment and social approval degree by doing their jobs,
so they will be increasingly unwilling to delay retirement. But high-skilled workers will
feel the opposite by doing their jobs because their human capital can increase as they
get older, so they will be more willing to retire later.
Based on the analysis above, people’s preference of the retirement delay is closely
associated with unemployment rate, wage rate, and the substitution effect of leisure on
consumption. Given the fact that the unemployment rate and the substitution effect of
high-skilled workers are smaller than those of low-skilled workers, and that the for-
mer’s wage rate is higher than that of the latter’s, it is more politically feasible to adopt
a differentiated plan of the retirement delay featuring high-skilled workers retire much




Simulation analysis of the impact of the retirement delay on pension deficit
Table 1 shows that by raising retirement age (δ), we can reduce the number of retirees
to reduce the pension deficit (d), but the effect will be restrained by the crowding-out
effect of employment. The more new workers crowded out by the retirement delay, the
less pension deficit it can reduce. Since the great retirement delay and the uniform
delay can pile out more workers than minor retirement delay and differentiatedTable 1 The retirement delay’s overall marginal effect on pension deficit








A A1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.12 0.26 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.3 –0.0563
A2 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.23 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.3 –0.0582
B B1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.12 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.3 –0.0539
B2 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.25 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.3 –0.0571
A differentiated plan, A1 great retirement delay, A2 slight retirement delay; B uniform plan, B1 uniform plan with more
delay, B2 uniform plan with less delay
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expected. It shows that, on the one hand, longer retirement delay is not necessarily ap-
propriate, and on the other hand, we cannot adopt a cookie-cutter approach to promot-
ing retirement delay, instead, we must choose a proper program of retirement delay
based on different employment situations of different groups.
Simulation analysis of the impact of retirement delay on unemployment rate
Table 2 indicates that the crowding-out effect on new workers (Δe) caused by a longer
retirement delay and a uniformed retirement delay is respectively greater than a shorter
retirement delay and a differentiated retirement delay. Retirement delay (δ) means the
older generations will keep occupying the jobs that are supposed to be handed over to
younger generations. The longer we delay retirement, the more jobs the older genera-
tions can occupy. Before delaying retirement, we have to consider the adaptability of
the labor market in the face of the crowding-out effect on employment (Gendell 1998).
The more flexible the labor market is, the longer we can delay retirement, and vice
versa. Rising the retirement age of the oversupplied low-skilled workers in a lesser mar-
gin and rising the retirement age of the under-supplied high-skilled workers in a greater
margin can alleviate the imbalance of the supply-demand structure of labor force. Be-
sides, since more low-skilled workers than high-skilled workers will be crowded out
after retirement delay, the impact of retirement delay on employment depends on the
proportion of low-skilled workers in the entire population. With higher proportion of
low-skilled workers in the entire population comes more workers being crowded out.
Thus, to reduce the proportion of low-skilled workers and help them increase their hu-
man capital to become high-skilled workers and have higher productivity is essential to
a feasible plan of rising retirement age.
Simulation analysis of the feasibility of different plans of retirement delay
Table 3 shows that under the circumstances of low unemployment rate, high wage rate,
and low substitution effect, the insured can accept longer retirement delay than under the
circumstances of high unemployment rate, low wage rate, and high substitution effect.
First, the preference of the insured for retirement delay (δ) is inversely proportional to un-
employment rate (e). The insured prefer shorter retirement delay if the unemployment rate
is high, and vice versa. The tendency indicates that it is politically feasible to allow short-
handed high-skilled workers to retire much later than the oversupplied low-skilled workers.
Second, the preference of the insured for retirement delay is proportional to wage
rate (w). The insured prefer longer retirement delay if their wage rate is high and vice
versa. This indicates that more people will approve that high-skilled workers with high
wage rate can retire later than low-skilled workers with low wage rate.Table 2 The impact of retirement delay on unemployment rate









A A1 0.7 0.5 0.005 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.26
A2 0.4 0.2 0.005 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.11
B B1 0.7 0.7 0.005 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.35
B2 0.4 0.4 0.005 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.21
A differentiated plan, A1 longer retirement delay, A2 shorter retirement delay, B uniform plan, B1 uniform plan with
longer delay, B2 uniform plan with shorter delay
Table 3 Preference of the insured for retirement delay









Low unemployment rate High-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.4144
Low-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.25 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.3 0.1746
High unemployment rate High-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.12 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.4097
Low-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.3 0.1629
Low wage rate High-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.4 0.2763
Low-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.25 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.2 0.1164
High wage rate High-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.4144
Low-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.25 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.3 0.1746
Low substitution effect High-skilled workers 1 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.4144
Low-skilled workers 0.7 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.25 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.3 0.2494
High substitution effect High-skilled workers 2 0.8 0.28 0.005 0.11 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.45 0.6 0.2072
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the substitution effect (μ). For the insured, the higher the substitution effect is, the less
tolerant they will be to retirement delay and vice versa. This indicates that as time
passes, the human capital of the low-skilled workers will depreciate, and they will feel
increasingly unfulfilled with their payment and jobs. So they will prefer a shorter retire-
ment delay. However, the high-skilled workers are in a different case. As their human
capital will accumulate and ramp up, the high-skilled workers will feel increasingly ful-
filled with the payment and their jobs. So they will prefer a longer retirement delay.
Thus, it is more politically feasible to allow high-skilled workers with low substitution
effect to retire later than low-skilled workers with high substitution effect.
In fact, the impact of unemployment rate, wage rate, and substitution effect on peo-
ple’s preference for retirement delay is related to the human capital of the insured. The
insured with more high-quality human capital prefer a longer retirement delay. In order
to address an aging population and the pension deficit, and persuade the insured to
work longer than their older generations, we must start from the investment in human
capital. The only way to improve the political feasibility of the pension reform should
be to ratchet up the productivity and job fulfillment of the insured, especially the low-
skilled workers.
Conclusions
Starting from the interaction between the pension deficit and the labor market, this
paper has offered a detailed mathematical analysis and simulation comparison with
regard to the selection mechanism of retirement delay plans, the effect of reducing
pension deficit, and the crowding-out effect on employment and political feasibility.
This research has found that early retirement under the circumstance of aging popu-
lation is a major contributor to pension deficit. Retirement delay can reduce the deficit,
but the effect is in an inverted U-shaped trajectory. The reduction of the pension deficit
due to the retirement delay will become smaller when it reaches a certain level. A lon-
ger retirement delay does not necessarily mean better results.
The effect of retirement delay on reducing pension deficit is restricted by the crowd-
out effect on employment (Gendell 1998). Extending workers’ retirement age will
crowd out new employees. The longer the extension is, the more new employees will
be crowded out. Besides, the crowding-out effect is different in various cases. Generally
speaking, short-handed high-skilled employees will be less affected, but the oversup-
plied low-skilled employees will be affected significantly. No matter how the crowding-
out effect on employment varies in different groups of people, retirement delay will
definitely increase unemployment rate and reduce the tax base (average wage rate) of
pension levy, which will compromise the reduction of pension deficit.
In fact, human capital and individual differences are related to retirement delay’s
effect on reducing pension deficit and crowding out new employees. If the insured have
more high-quality human capital, the retirement delay can reduce pension deficit more
significantly and have less effect on new employees. Generally speaking, as for low-
skilled workers, due to a lack of human capital which will depreciate as their working
years grow (Skirbekk 2008), they will be significantly impacted by retirement delay. The
source of pensions will become more limited along with the rise of unemployment rate
and the decrease of wage rate, which will deeply compromise the effect of retirement
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have more high-quality human capital which can appreciate as their working years
grow, retirement delay will insignificantly affect their real life. The source of pensions
will become prosperous along with the decrease of unemployment rate and the rise of
wage rate, which will contribute to the reduction of pension deficit.
However, no matter what effect can the retirement plan have on reducing pension
deficit and the labor market, without the endorsement of the majority of the insured,
the policy of rising retirement age will not be carried out. The preference of the insured
for retirement delay is proportional to the fluctuation of wage rate, while inversely pro-
portional to the unemployment rate and substitution effect. Since the high-skilled
workers have higher wage rate, lower unemployment rate, and the substitution effect of
leisure against consumption is small, they will feel more fulfilled with working as their
human capital accumulates and appreciates, so they are inclined to retire later. Since
the low-skilled workers have lower wage rate, high unemployment rate, and their sub-
stitution effect of leisure against consumption is large, they will feel less fulfilled with
working as their human capital depreciates, so they are inclined to retire early or at
least on time. Therefore, we should differentiate the retirement age based on education
background, work experience, technical training, and professions of the insured. For ex-
ample, university professors, surgeons, and research scientists can be allowed to retire
later than physical laborers such as construction workers. In this way, retirement delay
will not face much political resistance.
Based on the above research, from the perspective of the length of retirement delay, a
shorter retirement delay can have reduce pension deficit better than a longer retirement
delay and have less effect on the labor market. From the perspective of choosing the
right retirement plan, a differentiated approach to rise retirement age can produce re-
sults better than a uniform approach. Not only can the differentiated approach crowd
out fewer new employees, but also it can acquire support from the majority of the
insured. Regardless of the length and type of the retirement delay, we must attach
importance to the role of human capital investment in addressing pension and employ-
ment crises. It is the only path to rise the economic efficiency and political feasibility of
retirement delay by strengthening vocational training and college education for the
insured, especially for low-skilled workers (Qing 2011).Endnotes
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